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JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND DUE PROCESS IN WASHINGTON STATE-In re Deming, 108 Wash. 2d 82, 736 P.2d 639 (1987).
Belief in the basic integrity of judges lies at the heart of our legal
system. Judges perform a critical and highly visible function, and the
incompetence or dishonesty of even a few judges can erode the public's
confidence in the entire legal system. As concern for judicial integrity
has grown, so has an awareness of the need to protect judges from
frivolous or retaliatory disciplinary actions.1 Today, attorneys, the
public, and judges themselves are being forced to confront the problem
of how to regulate judicial conduct and behavior.
This Note evaluates recent developments in Washington State concerning due process rights in judicial disciplinary proceedings. The
focus is on In re Deming,' a recent disciplinary case decided by the
Washington Supreme Court. The analysis by the court in Deming
highlights the conflict between the desire to discipline wayward judges
and the need to protect the autonomy of the judiciary. The historical
and procedural background of the Deming case is discussed first, and
then three important procedural issues raised in the opinion are analyzed. The Note concludes that, although the court's broad due process holdings lack foundation, its specific procedural requirements are
justified.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

The Judicial Qualifications Commission

In recent years, the creation of a judicial oversight panel has been
the standard method of regulating judicial conduct at the state level?
In 1980, Washington became the last state to authorize the creation
of such a panel.4 The Washington Judicial Qualifications Commis1. This concern is reflected, for example, in a recent United States Supreme Court decision
permitting civil actions against judges for certain categories ofjudicial misconduct. See Forrester
v. White, 108 S. Ct. 538 (1988).
2. 108 Wash. 2d 82, 736 P.2d 639 (1987).
3. Before 1960, judicial discipline was regulated through the "traditional procedures of
impeachment, address, or recall." Shaman & Begue Silence Isn't Always Golden: Reassessing
Confidentialityin the JudicialDisciplinaryProcess, 58 TEMp. L.Q. 755 (1985). These procedures
gradually proved unsatisfactory and, in 1960, California established the first permanent state

judicial disciplinary commission. In 1965, other states began to follow suit and, by 1981, all fifty
states had established organizations with the authority to regulate judicial conduct. Id at
755-56.
4. See I. TEsrrOR & D. SINKS, JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2d ed. 1980). The
Washington Judicial Qualifications Commission was created in 1980 by constitutional
amendment. WASH. CONs'r. art. IV, § 31; WASH. REv. CODE § 2.64.010-.020 (1987).
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sion 5 was formed as a "one-tier" disciplinary board. The Commission
is authorized to conduct an initial investigation and factfinding hearing regarding allegations of judicial misconduct, and to recommend
disciplinary action to the state supreme court if necessary. The
supreme court then conducts an independent review of the Commission's recommendation and renders a final decision on what, if any,
discipline to impose.6 The Commission's recent genesis and infrequent
use, however, have left the full scope of its power and authority
unclear.7
B.

In re Deming

1.

FactualBackground

In late 1985, the Commission flexed its muscle in a disciplinary
action against Pierce County District Court Judge Mark S. Deming.'
In July of 1985, Judge Deming9 was served with a statement of allegations by the Judicial Qualifications Commission which detailed four
areas of reported judicial misconduct."1 Judge Deming replied to
5. By amendment to its rules effective April 3, 1987, the Washington Judicial Qualifications
Commission [hereinafter JQC] was renamed the Commission on Judicial Conduct [hereinafter
CJC]. At the same time, the Commission's rules were substantially modified. References in this
Note to the original rules will be to the JQCR and the Commission's new rules will be referred to
as the CJCR.
6. In a one-tier, or unitary, disciplinary system a single commission handles all phases of the
complaint from investigation through recommendation of disciplinary action to the state
supreme court. In a two-tier organization the investigative and adjudicative functions are
separated. One body receives and investigates complaints. Upon a finding of probable cause for
discipline, that body presents the complaint to a second board for adjudication. Forty states and
the District of Columbia have adopted a one-tier plan, nine have adopted the two-tier approach,
and the remaining states have a modified one-tier system that allows the first tier to impose
discipline directly. I. TESITOR & D. SINKS, supra note 4, at 3. For a discussion of the relative
merits of the two systems, see Cohn, Comparing One- and Two-Tier Systems, 63 JUDICATURE
244 (1979).
7. In re Deming, 108 Wash. 2d 82, 736 P.2d 639 (1987), was only the third case the
Commission had certified to the Washington State Supreme Court for review, and the first that
involved a public factfinding hearing. The previous two cases were In re Staples, 105 Wash. 2d
905, 719 P.2d 558 (1986), and In re Buchanan, 100 Wash. 2d 396, 669 P.2d 1248 (1983). The
court recently heard oral argument in a fourth judicial disciplinary case, In re Kaiser, J.D. No. 4
(1987). The principal issue in Kaiser involved judicial campaign statements. Kaiser, with the
possible exception of de novo review, does not involve the procedural issues discussed in Deming.
8. This section is a synthesis of the background statements made by the court, Judge Deming,
and the Commission. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 86-87, 736 P.2d at 641; Opening Brief of Mark
S. Deming, Judge, at 1-5, Deming, 108 Wash. 2d 82; Judicial Qualifications Commission's
Response Brief at 1-4, Deming, 108 Wash. 2d 82.
9. Judge Deming was elected to the Pierce County District Court, Tacoma, Washington, in
November 1982 and assumed the bench in January 1983.
10. The four areas of investigation included: The judge's personal relationship with a
probation department employee; sexual harassment of female employees; threats to the director

Judicial Discipline and Due Process
these allegations and provided information explaining the background
of certain political disputes and placing the allegations in context.1"
Three months later, Judge Deming was served by the Commission
with a formal complaint alleging numerous violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. 2 He was also provided with notice of the factfinding hearing, and informed that the Commission was considering opening the hearing to the public. 3 The Commission invited Judge
Deming to submit any concerns he might have regarding a public
hearing.
Judge Deming 4 objected to the holding of a public hearing and
asked the Commission to allow oral argument on this issue. The Commission refused to hear oral argument, ordered a public hearing, and
made public the complaint and allegations against Judge Deming.
After a six-day factfinding hearing, the Commission recommended
that Judge Deming be removed from office.' 5 The Commission then
certified the matter to the Washington State Supreme Court for
review. The supreme court heard oral argument in May of 1986, and
issued its opinion one year later.
2

The Deming Opinion

Review of the Commission's recommendation presented the Washington Supreme Court with an opportunity to discuss judicial discipline generally, and to outline some specific procedural standards for
application in future disciplinary proceedings. The court's opinion was
divided into two broad sections: A substantive review of the Commission's recommendations; and procedural issues and rulings.
The court's substantive review was straightforward and requires little discussion. The court held that the appropriate standard of review
of the probation department; and aberrant and unstable courtroom behavior. Deming, 108
Wash. 2d at 86, 736 P.2d at 641.
11. Id.
12. The court held that Judge Deming had violated Canons 1, 2, and 3(A)(3) of the
Washington Code of Judicial Conduct. Id. at 117, 736 P.2d at 657.
13. The constitutionality and appropriateness of a public factfinding hearing was a significant
issue on review. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
14. Judge Deming's original counsel withdrew on February 25, 1986. Judge Deming acted
pro se until he retained additional counsel on March 8, 1986. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 87, 736
P.2d at 641. On appeal, Judge Deming claimed that he did not receive effective assistance of
counsel due to the withdrawal of his original counsel and the limited time that his new counsel,
acting pro bono, had to prepare briefs for submission to the supreme court. The court rejected
this argument. Id. at 107-08, 736 P.2d at 652.
15. The factfinding hearing began on December 12 and continued until December 18, 1985.
Depositions and pretrial discovery commenced on November 18, 1985, and continued until the
evening of the first day of trial. Id. at 86, 736 P.2d at 641.

727

Washington Law Review

Vol. 63:725, 1988

was whether the Commission's recommendation was supported by
"clear, cogent and convincing evidence." 16 The egregious nature of
Judge Deming's conduct simplified the court's review on the merits.
After evaluating the evidence, the court concluded that Judge Deming
had breached the Code of Judicial Conduct, that the Commission's
recommendation of removal from the bench was appropriate, and that
the recommendation of removal should be upheld despite Judge Dem17
ing's previous resignation.
Before reviewing and approving the Commission's recommendation, the court considered a variety of procedural issues. This Note
focuses on three of these procedural issues: First, the need for adequate notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard regarding
the holding of a public hearing; second, the combination of functions
in the Commission and the appearance of fairness doctrine; and third,
the general issue of due process in judicial disciplinary hearings.' 8
II.

NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD

One of the first due process arguments discussed by the court was
Judge Deming's claim that he was not given adequate notice of the
factfinding hearing. The court, finding that the Commission's initial
letter to Judge Deming reasonably apprised him of the proceedings,
held that the notice requirements had been met. 9 The more difficult
question was whether the Commission's refusal to allow oral argument
on the public hearing issue was a violation of Judge Deming's due
process rights.

16. Id. at 109, 736 P.2d at 653. This is the standard set forth in JQCR, supra note 5, at 14(d).
Clear, cogent, and convincing evidence was defined by the court as evidence which is "weightier
and more convincing than a preponderance of the evidence, but which need not reach the level of
beyond a reasonable doubt." Davis v. Dep't of Labor and Indus., 94 Wash. 2d 119, 126, 615
P.2d 1279, 1283 (1980). The court rejected Judge Deming's contention that the standard
required more than one person's word against another. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 109, 736 P.2d
at 653; see also In re McDonough, 296 N.W.2d 648, 692 (Minn. 1979).
17. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 120-21, 736 P.2d at 659.
18. These are not the only procedural issues the court discussed, nor are they the only
controversial procedural rulings in the case. They are, however, the issues to which the court
devoted most of its attention.
19. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 99, 736 P.2d at 648. This is the standard set forth in Duffy v.
Dep't of Social and Health Services, 90 Wash. 2d 673, 585 P.2d 470 (1978), which addressed the
issue of adequate service of process on patients in mental institutions. The court in Duffy held
that "[d]ue process requires notice reasonably calculated to apprise a party of proceedings which
will affect him." Id. at 678-79, 585 P.2d at 474.
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A.

The Court's Discussion on the Right To Be Heard

Judge Deming argued that he was improperly denied the opportunity to contest orally the appropriateness of a public factfinding hearing.2" After ruling that public hearings were constitutionally
permissible, the court held that the Commission's refusal to allow oral
argument was not a due process violation.2 1 The court suggested that
oral argument might have been allowed, but stated that it did not want
to remand on this ground alone. It ruled that the denial of oral argu-

ment was not prejudicial in this case.22

The court relied on Parkerv. United Airlines to support its conclu-

sion that oral argument was not necessary.23 Parkerwas an employee
rights case involving the dismissal of a United Airlines flight attendant. The central question was whether Parker was an employee terminable at will. Having determined that she was, the court considered
the secondary issue of whether Parker's constitutional right to a hearing had been violated. Parker argued that she did not receive an adequate hearing because the trial judge wrote his decision to grant
summary judgment before hearing oral argument.2 4 With virtually no
discussion, the court held that Parker's due process rights had not
been violated.25
The court in Deming apparently was uncomfortable with its exten-

sion of the Parker rationale to cover disciplinary proceedings.26 The
court stressed that although a decision to hold a public hearing has

20. In a letter, dated October 21, 1985, the Commission informed Judge Deming that it was
considering holding a public disciplinary hearing, i.e., whether to apply JQCR, supra note 5, at
4(c), (d), and advising him that "anything pertaining thereto you wish the Commission to
consider should be submitted to the Commission office by October 31, 1985." In response, Judge
Deming, through counsel, sent a letter to the Commission, dated October 29, 1985, in which he
requested the opportunity to present oral argument on the appropriateness of holding a public
disciplinary hearing.
21. Judge Deming had argued that the Washington Constitution required all Commission
proceedings to be confidential, and that the holding of a public factfinding hearing was therefore
unconstitutional. After a lengthy discussion, the court rejected this contention. Deming, 108
Wash. 2d at 89-94, 736 P.2d at 643-45. The issue of constitutionality is not discussed in this
Note because a constitutional amendment has recently been ratified in Washington requiring all
judicial discipline proceedings to be open to the public, after an initial probable cause
investigation. Id at 90 n.l, 736 P.2d at 643 n.l; see also S.J. Res. 136, 49th Leg., Reg. Sess.,
1986. For a comprehensive discussion of the need for confidentiality in judicial disciplinary
proceedings, see Shaman & Begue, supra note 3.
22. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 98, 736 P.2d at 647.
23. Parker v. United Airlines, 32 Wash. App. 722, 649 P.2d 181 (1982).
24. Id at 724, 649 P.2d at 184.
25. Id at 728, 649 P.2d at 184.
26. The court began by emphasizing the "intangible yet precious value" of an individual's
reputation. The court quoted passages from Ecclesiastes 7:1, C. LAMB, LOVE, DEATH AND
REPUTATION, stanza 4, W. SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II, act 2, scene 2, line 177, and PUBLLIUS
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immediate and irrevocable consequences for a judge, the flexible
nature of due process requirements means that the lack of oral argument is only prejudicial in certain contexts.27 The court concluded
that in the context of a disciplinary hearing the lack of oral argument
did not prejudice Judge Deming.2 8
B. Analysis: Opportunity To Be Heard
The court's discussion plainly demonstrates the competing pressures facing a reviewing court in a disciplinary case. The court was
obviously concerned with protecting Judge Deming's procedural
rights. The court repeatedly stated that great harm could have
resulted from the Commission's refusal to allow oral argument, but
that no great harm would have occurred had the opportunity for oral
argument been granted. 29 Despite its belief that Judge Deming might
have been treated unfairly by the Commission, the court chose not to
remand the case.3 °
The court had to search to find a case supporting its refusal to
remand. In the end it relied on Parker. The facts of Parker, however,
are not even remotely analogous to those in Deming. Parkerinvolved
oral argument on the merits of the case. Deming involved oral argument on a collateral issue. The collateral issue, moreover, was one
that had clear constitutional implications, unlike the factual question
at issue in Parker.Finally, in Parker the trial judge had the opportunity to reverse his position after hearing oral argument on the summary judgment question. This opportunity to reconsider was not
present in Deming.
SYRUS, Maxim 77, to support the general maxim that "[a] good reputation is more valuable than
money." Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 96, 736 P.2d at 646.
27. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 97, 736 P.2d at 647. For example, the court cited Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971): "A procedural rule that may satisfy due process in one context may
not necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every case." In citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970), the court said: "The procedural safeguards afforded in each situation should be
tailored to the specific function to be served by them."
28. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 98, 736 P.2d at 647. To support this proposition, the court cited
Olympic Forest Products v. Chaussee Corp., 82 Wash. 2d 418, 511 P.2d 1002 (1973). Significant
portions of Chaussee are merely compilations of different United States Supreme Court cases, all
discussing the question of due process, and able to support virtually any viewpoint. Justice
Utter, in his concurring opinion, stated that the court "fail[ed] to apply the essential principle" of
the discussion in Chaussee. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 124, 736 P.2d at 661 (Utter, J.,
concurring).
29. The court held: "(a) oral argument was not required by due process, (b) it would have
been preferable to grant oral argument to the accused for his protection and (c) the lack of oral
argument did not prejudice him [Judge Deming]." Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 98, 736 P.2d at 647.
30. Id. at 98, 736 P.2d at 647.

Judicial Discipline and Due Process
The court mentioned some very practical concerns in refusing to
remand on this issue. The court suggested, for example, that any
harm done to Judge Deming could not be undone by remanding the
case. 3 1 The court also stated that a private hearing would not have
protected Judge Deming from disclosure of the allegations against
him, and that a public hearing provided Judge Deming with the best
opportunity to clear his name.32
These conclusions, however, are after-the-fact rationalizations. The
publicity surrounding a factfinding hearing, complete with television
and newspaper coverage, is different from the publicity surrounding a
simple press release. Some states which recognize this distinction prohibit any public disclosure until after the conclusion of the disciplinary
process. 33 Further, the court's contention that a public hearing provides the best opportunity for judges to clear their names begs the
question, as this is the very assumption that Judge Deming wished to
contest through oral argument.
Another justification, buried in the middle of the court's conclusion,
indicates a more basic concern. This concern was that a private hearing would damage public confidence and lead to reservations about the
objectivity of the disciplinary process.34 While this concern may be
valid, it does not respond to Judge Deming's argument. The issue was
not whether public hearings were desirable, but whether a judge ought
to have the opportunity to contest orally the appropriateness of a public hearing.
These concerns indicate that the court has not reached a settled conclusion regarding the extent of basic procedural protections available
to judges in disciplinary hearings. This uncertainty is made even more
evident by an inconsistency in the opinion. In the section just discussed, the court held that oral argument regarding the need for a
public factfinding hearing was not required. At the conclusion of its
due process discussion, however, the court explicitly held that a judge
has a right to an opportunity to be heard orally on the necessity of
holding a public hearing. 35 These contrasting holdings, although
31. Id. at 98, 736 P.2d at 647.

32. Id.
33. Id. In twenty-three states, confidentiality ceases when the Commission files a
recommendation for discipline with the state supreme,court; in ten states, confidentiality ceases
when discipline is ordered; and in nineteen states, confidentiality ceases wheii post-investigation
charges are brought against the judge. Shaman & Begue, supra note 3, at 797-98 (Appendix A).
34. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 98, 736 P.2d at 647.
35. Id. at 103, 736 P.2d at 650; see infra note 98 and accompanying text.
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moot,3 6 do not help in understanding how the court will interpret due
process rights in future disciplinary cases.
III.

THE COMMISSION'S COMBINATION OF FUNCTIONS

Judge Deming argued that the concentration of investigatory,
prosecutory, and adjudicatory powers in one body, the Commission,
violated the appearance of fairness doctrine. The court rejected this
argument.3 7 The discussion of this issue is important in Deming
because: First, the court clarified and implicitly extended previous
holdings involving the appearance of fairness doctrine; and second, the
court's conclusion raised questions about the necessary level of due
process protection required by the "appearance of fairness" doctrine.
A.

The Appearance of FairnessDoctrine

The appearance of fairness doctrine is unique to Washington, and
was formulated by the Washington State Supreme Court only two
decades ago.38 Under this doctrine, proceedings before a quasi-judicial tribunal are valid only if a reasonably prudent and disinterested
observer would conclude that all parties obtained a fair, impartial, and
neutral hearing.3 9 This test can be further divided into two parts: the
fairness of the hearing procedure, and the impartiality of the decisionmaker. 4 Judge Deming's argument focused on demonstrating
that the structure of the Judicial Qualifications Commission itself was
unfair.
B.

Washington State Medical Disciplinary Board v. Johnston

The court relied heavily on its previous discussion in Washington
Medical DisciplinaryBoard v. Johnston4 1 in concluding that the Commission's structure did not violate the appearance of fairness doctrine.
36. Supra note 21.
37. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 107, 736 P.2d at 652.
38. A valuable critical evaluation of the appearance of fairness doctrine can be found in
Comment, The Appearance of Fairness Doctrine: A Conflict in Values, 61 WASH. L. Rv. 533
(1986). A good sketch of the development of the appearance of fairness doctrine from its initial
application in the land use area through its extension to other types of quasi-judicial proceedings
can be found in Vache, Appearance of Fairness:Doctrineor Delusion?, 13 WILLAMETrE L. REV.
479 (1977).
39. Swift v. Island County, 87 Wash. 2d 348, 361, 552 P.2d 175, 183 (1976).
40. See Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 299, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (1972). The
latter aspect is also known as the bias standard and was not an issue in the Deming case.
41. 99 Wash. 2d 466, 663 P.2d 457 (1983). In Johnston, a preliminary investigation was
conducted after the first complaint, and an order of summary suspension was issued after a
second complaint was received. After a formal disciplinary hearing was held, the Board revoked
Johnston's medical license. Id. at 468-73, 663 P.2d at 459-61.
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The Johnston court held that the structure of the Washington State
Medical Disciplinary Board42 did not violate Johnston's due process
rights, because violation of the appearance of fairness doctrine
required something more than the combination of investigatory and
prosecutory functions.4 3 In Deming, the court analyzed whether the
addition of the prosecutory function of the Commission was the
"something more" which would tip the scales in favor of finding such
a due process violation. The court held that it was not.
The court made four arguments to support its conclusion that the

Commission's structure was at least as fair as the Medical Disciplinary
Board's structure in Johnston. First, the court noted that the members
of the Commission were attorneys,' not doctors, and suggested that
their knowledge of the relevant procedural protections, as well as their
integrity, was therefore assumed to be greater.4 5 Second, the court
emphasized that the Commission did not have as much power as the
Board." The Board had the power to impose sanctions, whereas the
Commission only had the power to make recommendations to the

supreme court. Third, the court noted that the Commission rules provided safeguards against "bias and prejudgment."'4 7 Finally, the court
emphasized that the investigation and prosecution of this case was
conducted by staff personnel who did not participate in the adjudica48
tory process.
42. The Washington State Medical Disciplinary Board was created by the Medical
Disciplinary Board Act, 1955 Wash. Laws 840 (codified at WAsH. REV. CODE § 18.72) (1987).
43. The court cited the following language from Johnston: "We are convinced that the mere
combination of adjudicative and investigative powers in one agency, without more, would not be
viewed by a reasonably prudent and disinterested observer as denying any party a fair, impartial,
and neutral hearing." Johnston, 99 Wash. 2d at 479-80, 663 P.2d at 465.
44. In re Deming, 108 Wash. 2d 82, 106, 736 P.2d 639, 651 (1987). The members of the
Judicial Qualifications Commission include three judges (one each from the superior court, court
of appeals, and district court), two attorneys, and two members of the public who are not
attorneys. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 31, amend. 71.
45. The court cited Nicholson v. Judicial Retirement & Removal Comm'n, 562 S.W.2d 306
(Ky. 1978), appeal afterremand, 573 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. 1978), for this assertion. This case stated
that there was a "presumption of honesty and integrity of the members of the commission, most
of whom are members of the bench or bar and cognizant of the proper standards applicable at
each stage of the proceeding." Ia at 309.
46. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 106, 736 P.2d at 652.
47. The only specific example of these safeguards cited by the court is JQRC, supra note 5, at
9(b), (c), which provide the judge the opportunity to challenge and preempt a specified number of
Commission members. Deming 108 Wash. 2d at 106, 736 P.2d at 652.
48. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 106, 736 P.2d at 652. This is not technically correct. The
Commission itself conducts the initial investigation through its executive officer. After reaching
a decision to proceed to a factfinding hearing, staff attorneys conduct pretrial discovery and serve
as prosecutors at the factfinding hearing. JQCR, supra note 5, at 5-8.
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C. Analysis: The Appearance of FairnessDoctrine and the
Combination of Functions
Several states have one-tiered commissions with structures identical
to that of the Washington State Judicial Qualifications Commission. 9
Not all states, however, have the same method of delegating the functions of the commission. Over half of the commissions in other states
provide for the hiring of an independent prosecutor. In another third
of the states, lawyers on the attorney general's staff, who are independent of the commission, act as prosecutors. In most of the remaining
states, including Washington, both the investigation and the prosecution are conducted by staff attorneys, or by independent attorneys
retained by the commission. °
The Deming court's ruling that the combination of functions in the
Commission is acceptable is in conformity with those states that have
similarly structured commissions with similar divisions of labor. A
difficulty arises, however, when the appearance of fairness doctrine is
considered. What might be acceptable in any other state might not be
acceptable given the existence of this unique Washington doctrine.
1.

The Court's Broad Interpretationof Johnston

In spite of the court's reliance on Johnston, it is not the definitive
statement on the application of the appearance of fairness doctrine to a
combination of functions problem. In fact, Johnston can be read to
allow or disallow the combination of functions found in the Commission. In addition, Deming and Johnston can be distinguished on several bases. Most importantly, Johnston only involves the combination
of the adjudicatory and investigatory functions, whereas the Commission also performs a prosecutory function. The combination of all
three of these functions raises legitimate questions about whether a
reasonably prudent and disinterested observer could conclude that a
fair and impartial hearing was possible.
49. See supra note 6.
50. I. TESITOR, JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS (1978). This is a summary of the
information presented in Table 8. Id. at 32.
51. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 107, 736 P.2d at 652. The fact that the medical board did not
possess prosecutory powers was the subject of some debate throughout the Johnston opinion.
The court in Deming stated that the majority in Johnston mentioned the triple combination of
functions several times. The only cited passage, however, does not refer to the facts in Johnston,
but to the facts in a previous United States Supreme Court case, Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35
(1975). Washington Medical Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnston, 99 Wash. 2d, 466, 477, 663 P.2d 457,
463 (1983). In fact, Justice Rosellini in his dissent in Johnston suggested that the majority
ignored the presence of the prosecutory function. Id. at 488, 663 P.2d at 469 (Rosellini, J.,
dissenting).

Judicial Discipline and Due Process
Perhaps recognizing the shortcomings of Johnston, the court suggested the additional grounds for concluding that the Commission in
Deming was fairer than the Board in Johnston. The court's first
assumption, that the bench and bar have a greater inherent honesty
than physicians, is at best uncertain. A layman probably would not
agree. Although members of the bar may have a greater knowledge of
the relevant standards of review, this knowledge does not necessarily
reflect their adherence to those standards, nor does it mean that the
appearance of fairness is enhanced. Indeed, given the fact that the
purpose of the Commission is to evaluate the misbehavior of judges,
this conclusion seems particularly inappropriate.
The court's second suggestion, that the Commission's limited power
increased the fairness of the proceedings, is also problematic. It is true
that the Medical Disciplinary Board, unlike the Commission, has the
authority to impose sanctions directly. Other state courts have held
that the power to impose sanctions requires that the defendant be provided with a greater degree of due process protection. 2 It does not
follow, however, that the power only to recommend a sanction makes
the proceedings more fair. Practically speaking, there is little difference between the power to impose and the power to recommend a
sanction. As the court stressed in its discussion on the right to oral
argument, a disciplinary action can have a harmful effect on an indiregardless of whether sanctions are directly
vidual's 5reputation
3
imposed.
The court's third statement, that the Commission's rules provide
safeguards against bias and prejudgment, simply begs the question of
how those safeguards can be preserved. Similar safeguards exist in the
courtroom, but no one is simultaneously allowed to be both a judge
and a prosecutor. Moreover, although in Deming the investigation
and prosecution were conducted by staff personnel, this situation is
not reassuring. From an appearance of fairness standpoint, whenever
the individuals who are responsible for adjudicating the defendant's
guilt are also responsible for hiring the prosecuting attorney and staff,
basic questions about the impartiality of the prosecution must be
raised.5 4 Concerns such as these indicate that the court would have
had little difficulty in finding a violation of the appearance of fairness
52. The Deming court cited Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971), and In re Nowell,

237 S.E.2d 246 (N.C. 1977).
53. This problem is made worse by the court's interpretation of its de novo review power. See
infra note 118 and accompanying discussion.
54. For a discussion of the shortcomings of the appearance of fairness doctrine when applied

to staff personnel in quasi-judicial proceedings, see Comment, supra note 38, at 560-62.
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doctrine. Indeed, such a conclusion might have been more consistent
with the analysis in Johnston.
2. Demise of the Appearance of FairnessDoctrine
For some time the appearance of fairness doctrine has come under
attack from several members of the Washington Supreme Court." A
minority of the justices have argued that the appearance of fairness
standard may in fact be more effectively interpreted as an actual fairness standard.5 6 In re Deming appears to be a step in this direction.
Prior to the Deming case, the court was divided on the question of
whether the appearance of fairness doctrine was simply a subcategory
of due process analysis." Although treated as a separate issue in
Deming, the court held that the doctrine was intrinsically related to
due process protections and rights.5 8 This shift away from the traditional appearance of fairness interpretation of the doctrine may signal
a trend toward a "simple fairness" test.
A review of the court's discussion reveals that the court was in fact
conducting a fairness analysis. An unbiased observer viewing the
Commission for the first time would question the fairness of its structure. The whole thrust of the court's argument, however, was that the
Commission's structure was fair, despite appearances to the contrary.
This fairness in fact analysis is not that envisioned by the appearance
of fairness doctrine.
Practically speaking, the court would have found it difficult to
require a complete restructuring of the Commission, and this may
explain the shift towards a fairness in fact analysis. The Commission
is a constitutionally created entity.59 The Washington Supreme Court
has stated that the appearance of fairness doctrine is not constitutionally based.' If the court held that the Commission's structure vio55. Id. at 551-52.
56. See, e.g., Harris v. Hornbaker, 98 Wash. 2d 650, 667-68, 658 P.2d 1219, 1229-30 (1983)
(Utter, J., concurring).
57. See Washington Medical Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnston, 99 Wash. 2d 466, 483-85, 663
P.2d 457, 466-67 (Utter, J., concurring).
58. That the appearance of fairness doctrine could be analyzed in terms of due process was a
point of contention in the Johnston case, with Justice Utter advocating the minority view. In
Deming, however, the court seemed to adopt Justice Utter's analysis: "As stated in the
concurring opinion by Justice Utter ... the appearance of fairness doctrine should consist of no
more than importing procedural due process safeguards into quasi-judicial proceedings of
legislative bodies." In re Deming, 108 Wash. 2d 82, 105, 736 P.2d 639, 651 (1987) (citing
Johnston, 99 Wash. 2d at 483, 663 P.2d at 467).
59. See supra note 4.
60. City of Bellevue v. King County Boundary Review Bd., 90 Wash. 2d 856, 863, 586 P.2d
470, 475 (1978) (dictum); see Comment, supra note 38, at 550.
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lated the appearance of fairness doctrine, the appropriate remedy
would have been to require a restructuring of the Commission.6" Such
a restructuring would not only have been exceedingly difficult to
accomplish, it also would have been contrary to the will of the legislature and the people.
IV.

DUE PROCESS

The court ruled for the Commission and against Judge Deming on
each of the specific due process issues it considered on review, with
reservations on some points.62 After addressing the procedural issues,
the court might have moved directly to a review on the merits on
Judge Deming's misconduct. Instead, the court again emphasized the
importance of due process protections in disciplinary cases.63 The
court made two due process holdings, delineated eleven specific procedural rights to which judges are entitled, and stated that its de novo
review power provided judges with additional due process protection.
A.

The Court's Broad Due Process Holdings

1.

The Court's Analysis

The court made two expansive due process holdings: First, that "a
judge accused of misconduct is entitled to no less procedural due process than one accused of crime," and second, that a judge "is entitled
to the same procedural due process protection when facing disqualification as a lawyer facing disbarment."' 6
61. In order to have a basis for restructuring the Commission, it would have been necessary
for the court to have ruled that the Washington constitutional amendment creating the
Commission was at odds with some aspect of the United States Constitution. Federal due process
analysis simply does not justify such a result. See infra notes 75 & 82 and accompanying text.
62. Under the general heading of "Due Process Considerations" the court considered the
following issues: Notice and opportunity to be heard concerning the holding of a public hearing;
notice of the charges; the right to present evidence and confront accusers; the right to prompt
resolution of the allegations; the atmosphere of the factfinding hearing; and the authority of the
Commission to sanction Judge Deming. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 94-102, 736 P.2d at 645-50.
The court expressed particular concern about the lack of an opportunity for the judge to be heard
regarding the holding of a public hearing. Id. at 95-98, 736 P.2d at 645-47; see supra note 22
and accompanying text.
63. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 102-04, 736 P.2d at 649-51. At the very beginning of the
opinion, the court stated: "Since this appeal was argued to this court Judge Deming has resigned.
We answer the issues raised because of their substantial public importance." Id. at 85, 736 P.2d
at 641.
64. Id. at 103, 736 P.2d at 650.
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The court supported the first conclusion by referring to the United
States and Washington constitutions;6 5 the second by citing In re Ruffalo6 6 and Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,6 7 two
United States Supreme Court cases. The problem, however, is that the
conclusions contradict one another by setting forth two different procedural standards.
The first conclusion is also supported by a simple syllogism: One,
judges facing disbarment have a property interest identical to those of
criminal defendants; two, criminal defendants have procedural protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution; therefore, three,
judges are entitled to the same due process protection as criminal
defendants. This interpretation is internally consistent. The weak
link, however, is the premise that attorneys and judges have the same
property interest as criminal defendants.
Justice Utter, joined by Justices Pearson and Brachtenbach,
objected to the majority's reasoning on the due process issue, although
he concurred in the court's final ruling upholding the Commission's
recommendation of removal.6 8 Justice Utter's principal objection was
that the extension of full due process protection to judges was dicta
and not binding on the court in future cases.69 He concluded that the
court's final discussion of a judge's due process rights constituted an
unwarranted advisory opinion and did not contribute to the resolution
of the case.7" In addition, Justice Utter claimed the decision would
open the court to criticism that it acted in a self-serving fashion to
protect judges by granting them procedural protections not available
to anyone other than criminals.7 1 Justice Utter also pointed out the
deficiencies of Ruffalo72 as support for the majority's conclusion that
attorneys have complete due process rights. Finally, Justice Utter suggested that the court had ignored cases on which it had relied in other
sections of the opinion. In its earlier analysis, the majority had concluded that due process is a "fluid concept which is measured by the
nature of the interest that may be adversely affected.",7 3 This principal
is neglected by the majority in its due process summary. The court's
65. U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI, XIV; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22 (amend. 10), art. IV, § 31
(amend. 71), cited in Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 103, 736 P.2d at 650.
66. 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
67. 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
68. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 121-25, 736 P.2d at 660-61 (Utter, J.,
concurring).
69. Id. at 121-22, 736 P.2d at 660.
70. Id. at 122, 736 P.2d at 660.
71. Id.
72. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
73. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 124, 736 P.2d at 661; see supra notes 27 & 28.
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sweeping due process ruling is not warranted, Justice Utter concluded,
because the loss of judicial office could not be equated with the "loss of
freedom and rights that threaten a criminal defendant."'74
2. Analysis of Due Process Rights in DisciplinaryHearings
There are three premises underlying the court's due process holdings: That Ruffalo grants full due process rights to attorneys; that
Joint Anti-Fascistprovides a link between attorney and judicial discipline; and that there is constitutional support for believing that judges
are guaranteed full due process of law in disciplinary proceedings.
The validity of each of these premises is debatable.
a.

In re Ruffalo

In Ruffalo, the United States Supreme Court held that attorney disciplinary proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and require a minimal level of due process protection.7" Ruffalo does not grant an
attorney the full panoply of rights afforded criminal defendants; nor
does it specifically extend these limited protections to judges.7 6 The
only protections the Supreme Court specifically recognized as available to attorneys facing discipline were the right to fair notice of the
charge and an opportunity to be heard.77
In Ruffalo, the charges brought against an attorney were revised
during the disciplinary proceeding on the basis of the testimony of the
accused attorney himself. The Supreme Court held that this action
resulted in the disciplinary proceedings becoming a trap for the
accused attorney, who was not properly informed of the charges
against him. The facts in Deming were quite different. Judge Deming
received proper and complete notice of the charges against him, and
the court had already stated that he was not denied due process protection on this account. The question was the extent of Judge Deming's remaining due process rights.
Most courts, including the Washington Supreme Court, have
refused to extend criminal due process protection to attorneys facing
disciplinary proceedings." In re Allper7 9 is the most striking example
74. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 125, 736 P.2d at 661.
75. Ruffalo, 390 U.S. at 550-551.
76. Justice Utter also pointed out that Ruffalo does not extend as far as the court seems to
believe. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 124, 736 P.2d at 661.
77. Ruffalo, 390 U.S. at 550.
78. See, eg., Napolitano v. Ward, 457 F.2d 279 (7th Cir.) (no fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1037 (1972), reh g denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973); Keiser
v Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (no right to confront accusers under sixth and
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of the Washington Supreme Court's refusal to do so, and its ultimate
holding is in direct conflict with the holding in Deming. In Allper, a
1980 discipline case involving an attorney's misuse of client funds, the
court held that attorney discipline proceedings are neither criminal
nor civil in nature, but fall into a unique category of their own.8" This
unique category allowed for flexibility in determining due process
requirements. Due process protections in such proceedings may be
relaxed, and are generally lower than in criminal proceedings.81
b.

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath

Even if Ruffalo had granted criminal due process protections to
attorneys in disciplinary proceedings, Ruffalo did not extend those
protections to judges. In an effort to justify this extension, the Deming
court quoted extensively from the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath.82 JointAntiFascist discussed the due process rights of defendants in the "loyalty"
hearings of the 1950's. Justice Douglas argued that the sixth amendment right to confront witnesses ought to be granted to such defendants even though they were not technically entitled to a right available
only to criminal defendants.8 3 The principal reason Justice Douglas
offered was the critical nature of such hearings in the lives of the
defendants.84 The Washington Supreme Court argued, implicitly, that
the same reasoning holds true for judges in disciplinary proceedings,
that due process protections ought to be extended to judges even if
they are not technically entitled to them.85
There are a number of problems with this reasoning. First, the argument in JointAnti-Fascist was limited to sixth amendment protections
involving notice of the charge and an opportunity to confront accusers.86 Moreover, the facts of JointAnti-Fascist do not support the conclusion of a necessary connection between attorney and judicial
discipline. There are real differences between a "loyalty" hearing
fourteenth amendments); Sharpe v. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Assoc., 448 P.2d 301 (Okla.) (no right
to jury trial), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 904 (1968).
79. In re Allper, 94 Wash. 2d 456, 617 P.2d 982 (1980).
80. "[D]isciplinary proceedings are not criminal actions; they are sui generis and peculiar to
themselves . . . . Allper's argument fails because due process requirements in these special
proceedings may differ from those in the criminal context." Id. at 467, 617 P.2d at 987.
81. Id. at 466-68, 617 P.2d at 987-88.
82. In re Deming, 108 Wash. 2d 82, 103, 617 P.2d 639, 650-51 (1987) (quoting Joint AntiFascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 177-80 (1951) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
83. Joint Anti-Fascist, 341 U.S. at 180.
84. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 104, 736 P.2d at 651 (citing JointAnti-Fascist, 341 U.S. at 180).
85. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 104, 736 P.2d at 651.
86. Joint Anti-Fascist, 341 U.S. at 178-80.
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which directly attacks the beliefs of a private citizen, and a disciplinary action against a judge who has been elected or appointed to his
position. The court stressed throughout the Deming opinion that the
primary purpose of judicial discipline is to protect the public.8 7 This
concern alone would justify a lower due process standard in cases of
judicial misconduct."8
c.

United States and Washington Constitutions

The court also appears to be interpreting the United States and
Washington Constitution as granting due process protection directly
to judges in a disciplinary proceeding. The court cited, without explanation, the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution, and article 1, section 22 (amendment 10), and
article 4, section 31 of the Washington Constitution. These sections
certainly affirm the proposition that criminal defendants have constitutionally defined due process rights. With the exception of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, however, the
cited clauses only apply to criminal defendants.89 The cited sections
do not expressly grant the same protections to those individuals not
facing criminal prosecution.
Both the United States and Washington Supreme Courts have distinguished between disciplinary hearings and criminal actions, and
have refused to grant the same procedural protection in disciplinary
hearings as in criminal cases. 90 In Washington, criminal actions are
defined as actions for which the authorized punishment is imprisonment. 9 1 Because the result of a judicial disciplinary proceeding is at
worst removal from office, and not imprisonment, it follows that the
proceedings are not criminal in nature. If judges are not accused of a
87. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 120, 736 P.2d at 659.
88. The court's analysis of JointAnti-Fascist would presumably apply to attorney disciplinary
proceedings as well. But, as Aliper made clear, the court would not accept this conclusion. In re
Allper, 94 Wash. 2d 456, 617 P.2d 982 (1980" see supra note 80 and accompanying text.
89. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
90. State v. Carpenter, 130 Wash. 23, 225 P. 654 (1924). The best example of the court's
reluctance to apply due process protections in non-criminal proceedings is Chmela v.
Department of Motor Vehicles, 88 Wash. 2d 385, 561 P.2d 1085 (1977) (administrative
proceedings); see also Dawson v. Hearing Comm., 92 Wash. 2d 391, 597 P.2d 1353 (1979)
(prisoner disciplinary proceeding); State v. Shannon, 60 Wash. 2d 883, 376 P.2d 646 (1962)
(probation revocation or modification proceeding).
91. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.04.040 (1987) defines a crime as "an offense.., for which a
sentence of imprisonment is authorized... ." See also State v. Eilts, 94 Wash. 2d 489, 494 n.3,
617 P.2d 993, 996 n.3 (1980).
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crime, then the rights of criminal defendants need not be extended to
them.

92

3. Limited Interest Justifies Limited Due Process Rights
The central theme running through the arguments presented above,
as well as in Justice Utter's concurring opinion and the motion for
reconsideration submitted by the Commission, is that a disciplinary
proceeding does not raise the same concerns as a criminal trial. The
court itself stated that judicial disciplinary hearings are not criminal in
nature. 93 In such quasi-criminal proceedings there has traditionally
been a reduced expectation of due process protections.
The Commission cited three factors which distinguish disciplinary
from criminal actions: 94 First, the purpose of a disciplinary action is to
maintain a standard of fitness, not to punish criminal activity; 9 5 second, the results of a disciplinary proceeding are not binding on the
Supreme Court-the Commission is only authorized to make a
recomendation;9 6 and third, the Commission has only limited power
to investigate judicial misconduct.9 7 The Commission stressed that
the importance of any disciplinary proceeding lies in the need to protect the public from incompetent, biased, or unprofessional judges.
These factors suggest that the court's final due process holdings are
too broad. No state has interpreted the Constitution as providing noncriminal defendants with complete due process protection. In particular, Washington has not granted such protection to attorneys, and
there is no reasonable basis to distinguish between attorney and judicial disciplinary proceedings. This does not mean that judges are not
entitled to any due process protection. As was discussed above, a disciplinary action has irrevocable consequences. The due process rights
granted to judges, however, simply do not have to be equivalent to
those granted criminal defendants.
92. See Motion of the Commission on Judicial Conduct for Reconsideration and Clarification
of the Court's Decision Dated May 7, 1987, at 14, In re Deming, 108 Wash. 2d 82, 736 P.2d 639
(1987) [hereinafter "Motion for Reconsideration"].
93. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 102, 736 P.2d at 650.
94. Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 92, at 15-18.
95. In re Zderic, 92 Wash. 2d 777, 600 P.2d 1297 (1979). These factors are very similar to the
distinctions made by the court when discussing the appearance of fairness doctrine. See supra
note 43 and accompanying text.
96. In re Buchanan, 100 Wash. 2d 396, 669 P.2d 1248 (1983). The Commission cited Keiser
v. Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (no right to confront accusers under sixth and
fourteenth amendments), as a leading case.
97. The principal case cited by the Commission is In re Whitaker, 463 So.2d 1291 (La. 1985).
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B.

Specific ProceduralProtections

1.

The Court'sEleven ProceduralRequirements

The court outlined eleven procedural protections to which every
judge charged by the Commission is entitled. These protections
include the right to: One, notice of the charge and the nature and
cause of the accusation in writing; two, notice, by name, of the person
or persons who brought the complaint; three, appear and defend in
person or by counsel; four, testify in his or her own behalf; five, confront witnesses face to face; six, subpoena witnesses in his or her own
behalf, seven, be apprised of the intention to make the matter public;
eight, appear and argue the merits of the holding of a public hearing;
nine, prepare and present a defense; ten, a hearing within a reasonable
time; and eleven, the right to appeal.9 8
No authority was cited to support these specific due process holdings. The protections listed are basic, although their application is
sometimes uncertain. 99 The question is whether there is a legitimate
basis for accepting each of the specific due process requirements set
forth by the court.
2. Justificationfor the Court'sProceduralRequirements
Instead of analyzing each of these requirements individually, several
broad grounds supporting the adoption of the court's specific procedural protections will be discussed. These include the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution, the Commission's rules
governing the factfinding hearing, and the appearance of fairness
doctrine.
a. FourteenthAmendment Rights
Under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution,
judges have a "claim of entitlement" to their office that constitutes a
protected property interest.'°° The extent of this protection, however,
probably is limited to adequate notice of the proceedings, and a trialtype hearing before discipline is imposed.'01 These two protections are
98. In re Deming, 108 Wash. 2d 82, 102-03, 736 P.2d 639, 650 (1987).
99. For example, protection number eight presented by the court gives a judge the right to
"appear orally and argue the merits of the holding of a public hearing." Id. at 103, 736 P.2d at
650. This, however, contradicts the court's previous holding that due process did not require
that a judge have an opportunity to be heard orally on the holding of a public hearing.
100. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
101. See Cohn, The Limited Due Process Rights of Judges in Disciplinary Proceedings, 63
JUDICATURE 232 (1979). Cohn notes that this claim of entitlement may not apply if the judge
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generally present in all judicial disciplinary proceedings and are specifically present in the Judicial Qualifications Commission's rules."0 2
Washington's analog to the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution10 3 has been construed at least as broadly as its federal counterpart.'O° In addition, the amendment creating the Judicial
Qualifications Commission contains language specifically mandating
confidentiality of the proceedings and requiring the Commission to
establish rules protecting the due process rights of judges.10 5
b.

The Commission's Rules

Rule 10 of the Judicial Qualifications Commission sets forth the
procedural rights of a judge at the factfinding hearing. The Commission has the power to create the rules that govern its proceedings. The
court implicitly confirmed this power by relying on the Commission's
rules to support several of its arguments.'0 6
The rights set forth in the Commission's rules include: The right to
notice of the initial proceedings; the right and reasonable opportunity
to defend against the allegations of the complaint by the introduction
of evidence; the privilege against self-incrimination; the right to be represented by counsel; the right to cross-examine witnesses; the right to
testify or not to testify; the right to issue subpoenas for the attendance
of witnesses; and the right to a prompt resolution of the allegations in
the complaint. Together, these rights effectively comprise the right to
a trial-type hearing required by the fourteenth amendment.
Unless the court finds the Commission's rules unconstitutional, the
rules the Commission sets forth are binding. In its motion for reconsideration, the Commission argued that it alone had the power to create rules governing its operation, and that any procedural rules
suggested by the court were not binding upon the Commission. t" 7
Whatever the merits of this argument, it does not affect the conclusion
that the Commission's rules are binding at the factfinding hearing and
provide judges with a degree of due process protection.
serves at the pleasure of the appointing authority and may be removed without cause, but such
situations are extremely rare. Id. at 234.
102. JQCR, supra note 5, at 10(a).
103. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
104. See Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975).
105. See supra note 4.
106. In re Deming, 108 Wash. 2d 82, 99-101, 736 P.2d 639, 648-49 (1987) (notice of the
charges, JQCR, supra note 5, at 6(b), fight to prompt resolution of actions, JQCR 5, 6).
107. Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 92, at 7.
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c.

Appearance of Fairness

The appearance of fairness doctrine also dictates certain minimum
due process protections, often duplicating those listed above.10 8
Appearance of fairness has been held to require that interested parties
have adequate notice of a hearing,10 9 right to be heard, 110 right to
cross-examine witnesses, I right to have knowledge of all communications with the decisionmaker, 112 and a right to a verbatim record of
the proceedings.1 13 In addition, the bias standard inherent in the
appearance of fairness doctrine also discourages prejudgement of the
issue by the adjudicator or participation in the decisionmaking process
by an adjudicator with a financial or personal interest in the decision.
d.

Uncertain ProceduralRequirements

The only requirements that remain to be discussed are the right to
notice of the name of the individual who brought the complaint, the
right to confront witnesses face to face, and two requirements concerning confidentiality of the proceedings. The two requirements concerning confidentiality have been superseded by constitutional
amendment. 14 The justification and application of the first two
requirements is uncertain.
The right to confront witnesses may be specific to the Deming case.
It probably relates to Judge Deming's assertion that he was not
allowed to make eye contact with witnesses during depositions. 1 ' The
requirement of notice by name of the person who made the complaint
is left to the discretion of the Commission under the Commission's
rules.11 6 Such discretion might conflict with the right to confront witnesses if the complainant chooses to testify. Both requirements benefit
108. See Comment, supra note 38; see also text accompanying notes 38-40.
109. Glaspey & Sons, Inc. v. Conrad, 83 Wash. 2d 707, 521 P.2d 1173 (1974).
110. Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d 715, 739-42,453 P.2d 832, 845-46 (1969) (right to
be heard and have knowledge of all communications with decisionmaker).
111. Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d 858, 870-71, 480 P.2d 489, 496 (1971)
(cross-examination).
112. Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d 715, 734-41, 453 P.2d 832, 843-47 (1969)
(disallowing private meetings of decisionmaker with single party).
113. Parkridge v. City of Seattle, 89 Wash. 2d 454, 464, 573 P.2d 359, 365 (1978).
114. All Commission proceedings are now required to be open to the public after the initial
probable cause investigation. The court recognized this fact in its opinion and concluded that the
specific procedural requirements contrary to the amendment were no longer valid. In re
Deming, 108 Wash. 2d 82, 103, 736 P.2d 639, 650 (1987); see supra note 4.
115. Judge Deming alleged that he was not allowed eye contact with various witnesses during

depositions. This assertion was not documented in the record. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 99-100,
736 P.2d at 648.

116. CJCR, supra note 5, at 4(e)(iv).
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judges because they might prevent a complaint from being filed or a
witness from voluntarily coming forward. There is, however, ample
17
precedent for allowing such procedural rights.'
C. De Novo Review as a ProceduralSafeguard
The court concluded that the procedural errors made by the Commission could be remedied through the court's power of de novo
review. This is an aspect of the court's more general theme that its de
novo review of the Commission's proceedings provide judges with
additional procedural safeguards. Unfortunately, the court's interpretation of its de novo review power is overbroad.
The Washington State Constitution requires the court to review the
Commission's recommendation, but does not state what the nature of
the review ought to be. The Deming court held that it was required to
conduct a de novo review. 1 8 This holding is consistent with rulings in
other states with "single-tier" judicial review systems.1 19 The court's
interpretation of de novo review power, however, leads to difficulties
for two reasons. First, the court stated that a de novo review made any
errors, irregularities, or invasions of constitutional rights at the trial
level immaterial.12 ° Given this standard, it is easy to see why the
court did not feel any compelling need to remand the case, even when
it perceived procedural problems at the level of the initial hearing. In
fact, under this standard it might never be necessary to remand a case
to correct procedural errors.
Second, the standard itself undermines the alleged benefits of de
novo review. The court stated that de novo review provided judges
with additional due process protection."' Because the judiciary was
the only branch of government subject to administrative oversight, de
novo review was necessary to curb possible abuses of the Commission's
power.'22 While de novo review might rectify substantive errors, the
court's standard does little to protect a judge from procedural abuse
during the initial proceedings. In fact, such a standard may undermine the procedural protection available at the factfinding hearing. If
117. See generally Shaman & Begue, supra note 3.
118. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 87-89, 736 P.2d at 641-43. The court also held that its de
novo review was not limited to the record, but that the court was free to evaluate independently
the evidence and to review supplemental evidence if necessary.
119. See supra note 6.
120. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 89, 736 P.2d at 642 (quoting 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative
Law § 698 (1962)).
121. Id.
122. Id.
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any procedural errors made by the Commission can be remedied on
review, there is little initial incentive to correct them.
The court appears to have come full circle. Initially, it wanted to
insure that judges received adequate due process protection. As a
result, the court held that judges were entitled to extensive due process
protections. If the court faithfully applied its broad due process standards, however, it would have remanded the case. The court was
therefore forced to rely heavily on its broad power of de novo review to
avoid remanding the case. But, by relying on de novo review in this
fashion, the court has undermined the due process protections it was
trying so hard to install.
To escape this dilemma, the court should limit its due process and
de novo review holdings in Deming. The specific due process protections outlined by the court are both acceptable and necessary. They
form a solid foundation onto which the court can add additional due
process protections as required on a case-by-case basis. For these protections to be effective, however, the court must be willing to remand a
case for rehearing when a specific requirement has not been met. Failure to do so can only undermine both the public's and the judiciary's
faith in the Judicial Qualifications Commission.
V.

CONCLUSION

Effective judicial discipline requires a frustrating balancing of objectives. On the one hand, public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary needs to be reinforced; on the other, the rights of judges facing a
disciplinary action must be protected. These objectives of confidence
and independence are mutually exclusive, and a balance is difficult to
achieve. The confusion that is present in the Deming opinion demonstrates the difficulties involved in balancing such divergent goals.
In the Deming case these inconsistencies may go unnoticed because
of the egregious nature of Judge Deming's misconduct. The court
agreed that Judge Deming deserved to be removed from the bench and
strongly censured. The confusion in the court's opinion, however,
does not help the Commission or the public understand how future
disciplinary proceedings ought to be conducted. In the long run, such
confusion will undermine the public's faith in the judicial system and
can only work to the disadvantage of judges.
Naturally, comprehensive procedural standards cannot be formulated in a single case. Over time, the court should strive to develop a
consistent framework of procedural protections for judges. The
court's specific procedural protections provide a strong foundation on
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which to build. In future cases the court ought to abandon the notion
that judges are entitled to sweeping due process protection, and focus
instead on strictly enforcing the more limited due process rights to
which judges are entitled.
Stephen Hobbs

